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It is of practical importance in 
decision situations involving risk to 
train i tidi v idual s to transform 
uncertainties into subjective probability 
estimates that are both accurate and 
unbiased. We have found that in decision 
situations involving risk, people often 
introduce subjective bias in their 
estimation of the likelihoods of events 
depending on whether the possiblr: 
outcomes are perceived as being "good" or 
"bad" . Until now, however, the 
successful measurement of individual 
differences in the magnitude of such 
biases has not been attempted. In this 
paper we illustrate a modification of a 
procedure originally outlined by 
Davidson, Suppes, and Siege1 [ 3 ] .  to allow 
for a quantitatively-based methodology 
for simultaneously estimating an 
individual's subjective utility and 
subjective probability functions. The 
procedure is now an interactive computer- 
based algorithm, DSS, that allows for the 
measurement of biases in probability 
estimation by obtaining independent 
measures of two subjective probability 
functions (S+ and S-) for "winning" 
(i.e., good outcomes) and for "losing" 
(i.e., bad outcomes) respectively for 
each individual, and for different 
experimental conditions within indi- 
viduals. The algorithm and some recent 
empirical data are described. 
It is argued that, if in decision 
situations involving substantial risk or 
potential loss, our goal is to train 
individuals to become expert decision 
makers, it is important to understand how 
people subjectively evaluate and 
represent uncertainties or Probabilities. 
Decision theorists have argued for some 
time that any decision analysis under 
risk must involve the assessment of 
uncertainties, and that uncertainties can 
best be measured by subjective 
probabilities that represent the decision 
maker's degree of belief about the 
relevant uncertain events. The decision 
maker must somehow transform uncer- 
tainties into subjective probability 
estimates that are both accurate and 
unbiased. There is, however, convincing 
evidence that in many complex decision 
situations involving risk or uncertainty, 
people use heuristics that often 
introduce bias in the subjective 
estimation of the likelihoods of events 
that are relevant to the outcomes of the 
decision 18, 201.  They may judge the 
probability of an event by its 
representativeness of a class of events, 
by its availability in memory as a 
relevant example, or on the basis of an 
adjustment from a numerical anchor point. 
Recently published edited volumes by 
Arkes and Hammond [l] and Kahneman, 
Slovic, and Tversky [lo] reflect this new 
direction of study in the field of 
judgment and decision making research. 
Studies have shown that people generally 
do not make good probability estimates 
[6, 10, 11, 16, 1 7 ,  181.  They 
overestimate low and underestimate high 
probabilities and they ignore base-rate 
information [2, 121; they revise opinions 
too conservatively [4]; they indicate 
excessive confidence in their judgment 
[ 7 ] ;  and they are influenced by their 
affective mood state [9, 151. 
However, only recently have 
systematic research efforts investigating 
the cognitive mechanisms by which biases 
are generated been reported. For 
example, Nygren and Isen [15] have shown 
that a positive mood state can lead 
decision makers to exhibit "cautious 
optimism" in risky choice situations. 
They become optimistic in the sense that 
they tend to overestimate the likelihood 
of "good" events and underestimate the 
likelihood of "bad" events; but at the 
same time they exhibit a cautious shift 
toward risk-aversion in the 
choices. 
Such findings imply the 
models that interrelate 
processes and judgmental biases 
r actual 
need for 
cognitive 
Wickens 
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[21] has t~rgiied that without an 
understanding nf t h e s e  biases i n  such a 
framework, i t  is difficult to predict h o w  
specific decisions ar'r bvirig: mado by 
individuals. But, how can such biases be 
quantitatively measured'? Most models of 
decision muking under- risk assume that 
there are four basic questions that 
remain the focal issues in decision 
analysis. They are: (1) what are the 
possible courses of action? (2) what are 
the outcomes associated with thcsc 
courses of action? ( 3 )  what is the 
utility associated with each outcome?, 
and (4) what is the probability 
associated with each outcome? Much 
quantitative and empirical research 
continues to focus on Questions 1, 2, and 
3, and, in particular, the measurement of 
u t i . Z i t y  [5, l o ] .  This paper describes a 
method to take a closer look at Question 
4 .  the measurement of the s u b j e c t i v e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  
MATHEMATICAL MODELS 
There are two leading models of 
risky decision making upon which this 
research is based, subjective expected 
utility ( S E U )  theory and Kahneman and 
Tversky's prospect theory [13]. In SEU 
theory the overall utility of a course of 
action or "gamble" is found by taking, 
for each possible outcome in the gamble, 
the product of the utility of the outcome 
multiplied by the subjective probability 
associated with that outcome's 
occurrence, and summing these terms 
across all outcomes. The decision maker 
is assumed to choose the gamble/option 
with the highest overall expected 
utility. Prospect theory proposes that 
the decision process is, in fact, 
completed in two phases, with the 
potential courses of action first being 
"framed" for the choice process. This 
framing often may constitute a 
preliminary look at the outcomes, and 
this look sometimes results in a 
simplified representation of the choice 
alternatives, particularly if the 
alternatives are complex. Following this 
initial phase, the alternatives are 
actually evaluated in a manner similar to 
that suggested by S B U  theory, where the 
alternative with the highest value 
(utility) is chosen. 
Both models take the same general 
form, then, in that overall preference 
for a course of action or gamble ( C )  is 
assumed to be a function of (a) the 
values or utilities of the possible 
outcomes and (b) the subjective 
probabilities (in S E U  theory) or decision 
weights (in prospect theory) associated 
with these outcomes. Expressed mathe- 
matically, for a simple gamble of the 
form G = ( x ,  p ;  y ,  I - p )  where one 
obtains outcome x with probability p or 
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out t - o m t :  y 
subjective 
assumed in 
V(C) = V ( x )  
where V ( x )  
and S ( p }  is 
is associa 
with probability I - p ,  the 
value of the gamble ( C )  is 
hese models to be 
* S ( P 1  -+ V(Yl * S ( 1 - p )  (1)  
is the utility of outcome x 
a subjective probability that. 
ed with outcome, x .  In 
prospect theory S ( p )  is a d e c i s . i o n  w e i g h t  
rather than a probability estimate, per 
se. These decision weights are aa::;i-ctl 
to increase monotonically with objeciive 
probabilities of events, but are larger 
than the objective probabilities for 
extremely unlikely outcomes and smaller 
than the objective probabilities for more 
likely outcomes. In prospect theory the 
decision weights for complementary events 
with probabilities p and I - p  need not 
necessarily add to one, but will 
generally be less than one, a property 
that Kahneman and Tversky I131 label as 
s u b c e r t a i n  t y .  
However, since both S E U  and prospect 
theory are based on the same simple 
bisymmet.ric model, they do not allow for 
a differential weighting of an event's 
probability in winning versus losing or 
"good" versus "bad" contexts as we have 
recently found [ 9 ,  15, 161. That is, the 
models do not allow for the possibility 
that a decision maker might weight or 
even evaluate a probability like . 2  or . E  
differently, depending on the outcome 
with which it is associated. To account 
for such findings one needs a 
modification of SEU with a dual  
probability function. Such a model has 
been formally proposed by Luce and Narens 
~ 4 1 .  Their dual bilinear model would 
allow for the measurement of probability 
bias, where "good" and "bad" outcomes 
can differentially affect subjective 
judgments of the same explicitly stated 
probabilities. 
THE QUANTITATIVE METHOD 
A modification o f  the procedure used 
originally by Davidson, Suppes, and 
Siege1 [ 3 ]  is now a computer-based 
algorithm, DSS, (cf. [ 161 ) that 
independently measures the utility and 
subjective probability functions ( U  and 
S) in E q .  1 above. Specifically, the S 
function is measured separately as two 
functions, S+, and S-, in order to assess 
potential bias in judgments of the 
likelihoods of good (S+) and bad (S-) 
outcomes. To the extent that the same 
function is obtained for S+, and S-, no 
context bias of this type is present in a 
decisicn maker's probability estimates. 
To the extent that the functions obtained 
for S+, and S- differ, a me8SUr8ble 
cognitive bias exists in the individual's 
probability estimation process. 
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The DSS proccdurc i nvo 1 vcs 
determining the equal ity o r  indifference 
point in sequences of pairs of gambles s o  
that Eq. 1 can be found for each gamble, 
and thcsc equations can then be cqunted 
and solved in order to estimate the 
subjective utili t,y associated with 
various outcomes. This utility function 
is then used in a second phase to 
es t i ma t e p rob ab i 1 i t y 
functions. On each trial, an individual 
is presented with two two-outcome gambles 
and is asked to indicate which of the two 
s/he prefers. The two-outcome gambles 
are s e t  up as follows: Individuals are 
told that in each gamble, one outcome 
would be obtained if the event E occurs 
and the other outcome would be obtained 
if the event E does not occur. The event 
E is never specified, but. individuals are 
informed that i t  has a true computer- 
generated probability of one-half. (Data 
from several studies have indicated that 
such inst.ructions produce no bias bet.ween 
these two alternatives of E and not E; 
individuals indeed weight the two events 
equally.) On each trial, one gamble, 
Gamble 1, has both outcomes fixed at 
specified values (e.g., some amount of 
money or points); the other gamble, 
Gamble 2 ,  has one fixed outcome and one 
that is varied. For each of a specified 
number of trials (eight in the current 
version of DSS), the individual is asked 
to compare Gamble 1 with Gamble 2 .  The 
variable outcome in Gamble 2 is modified 
by DSS contingent upon the individual’s 
response. 
t he sub j ec t i ve 
The decision maker’s task on each 
trial is simply to indicate which gamble 
s/he prefers. If Gamble 1 is preferred, 
the variable outcome in Gamble 2 is 
adjusted upward by DSS to make this 
gamble more attractive; if Gamble 2 is 
preferred. the variable outcome in Gamble 
2 is lowered to make this gamble less 
attractive. The amount of adjustment 
made by DSS depends on whether the 
individual indicates that one gamble is 
either slightly or strongly preferred to 
the other. Since events E and not E have 
probabilities fixed at . 5  and these 
events are weighted as equivalent in 
probability, DSS determines the 
subjective utility function by noting in 
the variable-outcome gamble the 
value/amount necessary for a subject to 
change his/her preference ordering 
between the fixed-outcome and variable- 
outcome gambles (indicating the 
indifference or equivalence point for 
that pair of gambles). That is, DSS 
notes the amount that the individual 
assigns to the variable outcome in Gamble 
2 such that s/he no longer has a clear 
preference for either Gambles 1 or 2 .  
One sequence of pairs of gambles we 
have used with DSS is presented in Table 
I ;  we will use these values throughout 
the remainder of this paper as an 
illustration. Kach of the eight 
situations presented in Table I actually 
cons is ts, then, of H series of 
adjustments to Gamble 2 that lead to the 
estimat.ion of a subjective utility scale. 
For example, for the sequence presented 
in Table I ,  in the first situation, the 
individual is faced with one gamble for 
which s/he would lose $10 with p = .5  
(i.e., if E occurs) and would l o s e  $10 
with p = .5 (if not E occurs). This, 
then, is a sure-loss gamble. The 
alternative gamble in the pair is 
described as resulting in a loss of -$A 
dollars with p = .5 ,  and a gain of $10 
with p = .5. The money amount associated 
with - $ A  is initially randomly set to a 
large negative value or to a large 
positive value making one gamble 
initially more attractive. The 
individual adjusts the variable value up 
or down as necessary to reach 
indifference between the gambles (-$lo, 
-$lo) and (-$A, +$lo). The final dollar 
amount associated with -$A is recorded 
for the individual by DSS so that this 
information can be used to determine 
other utility values in subsequent Trials 
3 ,  4, and 6 .  
Table I 
Construction Sequence for 
Used to Find Individual Uti 
Gamble 1 Gamble 2 
Trl Get Get Get Get 
____--_---_----_____------- 
1 -10 -10 - A +10 
2 +10 +10 -10 + B 
3 -10 + B - A  + c  
4 - A +10 - D  + E  
5 - D  + B  - E  + C  
6 - A  + C  - D  + F  
7 - D  + F  - E  + G  
8 - E  + C  - H  + F  
Trials 1 - 8 
ity Functions 
Subjective 
Utility 
To facilitate the estimation 
process, we first assign a utility of +1 
to + $10 and a utility of -1 to - $ l o .  
(Because in SKU theory the subjective 
utility scale is unique up to an affine 
transformation, that is, it is interval, 
we can without any loss of generality 
assign the utilities of +1 and -1.) 
Then, after -$A is found, we can 
determine that the utility value, V ( - $ A ) ,  
equals - 3 ,  by substituting in the formula 
in Kq. 1 
S+(.5) * (-1) + S - ( . 5 )  * (-1) = 
S+(.5) * (+1) + S - ( . 5 )  * V ( - $ A ) .  ( 2 )  
In a manner comparable to that for Trial 
1 in Table I ,  a value for +$E can be 
found next by comparing the gambles ( +  
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$10, + $10) and (-$lo, +$B), yiclding the 
amount that is associated with a utility, 
V(+$B). of +3. These values o f  -$A and 
+$B are then used in Trials 3 - 8 to 
determine other points on the subjective 
utility scale. Currently, DSS finds an 
estimate for +$C, -$D, -$E, +SF, +SG, 
and -$H, which have utility value of + 5 ,  
- 5 ,  - 7 ,  + 7 ,  4-9, and -9 ,  respectively as 
shown in Table I. 
PROBABILITY ESTIMATION 
Once these eight points on the 
utility function have been obtained along 
with - 1  and +1, a nonlinear regression 
analysis is completed to find the best 
fitting utility curve for the estimated 
point values. A typical observed curve 
is shown in Figure 1. Given this best 
fitting curve, other utility values can 
then be estimated for the individual. 
TYPICAL ESTIMATED I m L m  FUNCTION 
Figure 1. A Typical Utility Curve for 
Money. Losses End Is Steeper Than 
Gains End, Indicating Loss-Aversion. 
A new series of gambles, now with 
different explicitly stated probability 
values, are used to obtain the subjective 
probability functions for winning (i.e., 
"good" outcomes) and losing (i. e., "bad" 
outcomes). Again, in the variable 
gamble, Gamble 2, one outcome is obtained 
if the event B ( S ( p )  = - 5 )  occurs and the 
other outcome is obtained if the event B 
does not occur (also S(p) = . 5 ) .  The 
fixed gamble is similar to those 
presented in the utility estimation 
phase, except that now the probabilities 
of winning and losing are either . 2 / . 8 ,  
.4/. 6 ,  . 6 / . 4 ,  o r  .8/. 2. 
could also be progr.ammed 
variable outcome in Gamb 
modified in a series of s 
individual indicates that 
are equally attract.ive. 
such a gamble -is shown in 
(01  htar values 
nto D S S . )  The 
2 is  again 
c a p : ;  unt i 1 the 
the two gambles 
An cx;tmpl(. of 
Figure 2 .  
-D [-51 t E  [t3] -A [-31 t X  
m VWES 
Figure 2 .  Rxample of Two Gambles in the 
Probability Estimation Phase. 
Table I1 shows an illustrative 
series of eight trials used to estimate 
the probability functions. Letters A - H 
represent the amounts found previously on 
Trials 1 -- 8, and X and Y are the 
variable outcomes; the stated probability 
values for each outcome are shown in 
parentheses. Note that on two pairs of 
trials (Nos. 9/11 and 13/15; Nos. 10/12 
and 14/16) a subjective probability of 
winning value ( S + )  and probability of 
losing value (S-) is estimated for each 
of the values 2 . ,  .4, .6, and .8. 
Table I1 
Construction Sequence for  Trials 9 - 16 
Used to Find Individual Probability 
Functions 
Gamble 1 Gamble 2 
Tr 1 Get Get Get Get ----___----___----_-____________________- 
9 - D(.5) + F ( . 5 )  - A(.6) + X(.4) 
10 - D ( . 5 )  + B ( . 5 )  - H ( . 2 )  + X(.8) 
11 - A(.5) + C(.5) - D ( . 4 )  + X(.6) 
12 - D(.5) + B ( . 5 )  - A(.8) + X(.2) 
13 - E(.5) + C(.5) - D(.6) + Y(.4) 
14 - A(.5) + C ( . 5 )  - D ( . 2 )  + Y(.8) 
15 - D(.5) + B ( . 5 )  - E(.4) + Y(.6) 
16 - A(.5) + C(.5) -10(.8) + Y ( . Z )  
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Since events 6 and not E havc 
probabilities fixed at . 5  and the events 
are weighted by the individual as 
equivalent in probability, we can assign, 
with loss of generality, S+(.5) = S-(.5) 
= .5. Equations 3 and 4 illustrate two 
examples of trials where St(.8) and 
S - ( . 2 )  are then determined as follows: 
S t ( . 5 ) * Y ( +  $B) + S - ( . 5 ) * Y ( -  $D) = 
S + ( . 8 ) * Y ( +  $X) + S-(.2)*Y(- $H) (3) 
S ' ( . S ) * V ( +  $Y) + S - ( . Z ) * Y ( -  $D) (4) 
S S ( . 5 ) * Y ( +  $C) + S - ( . 5 ) * Y ( -  $ A )  = 
If we assume that these two subjective 
probabilities act like objective 
probabilities and add to one, where 
S*(.8) = 1 - S-(.2), then by substituling 
in utility values obtained from the 
estimated utility curve for -$A, +$E, 
+$C, -$D, -$€I, +$X, and +$Y, two 
independent estimates of S+(.8) and S- 
( . 2 )  can be obtained by solving Eqs. 3 
and 4. If we do not wish to assume that 
these two subjective probabilities add to 
one, we can still estimate S*(.8) and S- 
( . 2 )  since we have two equations and two 
unknowns. In a comparable manner we can 
find restricted (i.e., add to one) or 
unrestricted (i.e., do not add to one) 
est,imates of S-(.8) and S + ( . 2 )  from two 
new equations, and similarly for Ss(.6) 
and S-(.4) and S-(.6) and S+(.4). Other 
probability values could also easily be 
estimated. 
Regardless of whether a restricted 
or unrestricted model is fit, and 
regardless of the shape of each 
individual's subjective utility function, 
the S* and S- functions should be the 
same if no probability bias due to a good 
vs. bad context exists in an individual's 
data. That is, if no bias exists, we 
should expect S-(.2) = S+(.2), S-(.4) = 
S+(.4), S-(.6) = S+(.6), and S-(.8) = 
S+(.8). 
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE 
Subjects. Thirty-two male and 
female undergraduate students at The Ohio 
State University volunteered to par- 
ticipate in this study in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements of their 
introductory psychology course. 
Procedure. On each trial, subjects 
were presented with two two-outcome 
gambles and were asked to indicate which 
of the two they preferred. In this way 
both subjective utilities and subjective 
probabilities for .2 - .8 were indepen- 
dently estimated. The subjects were 
instructed that they would be asked to 
make choices between pairs of gambles, 
and after they had indicated all of their 
preferences, some of the choice 
situations would be randomly sampled and 
~iItiy(:tl. The gamlilc that they would play 
in each pair would be randomly picked 
between the two gamblcs indicated to be 
equally attractive o n  each trial. Each 
subject. was given 1 0 0  points, 
representing his or her credit for 
participating and was told that s/he 
would be gambling with this credit (not 
money) in the randomly selected gambles. 
Subjects were told that. as a result of 
the gambling, they might either lose 
their credit hour if they lost their 100 
points, retain their credit hour if they 
finished with more than zero points, or 
gain an additional credit if they 
finished with more than 200 points. At 
this point, all subjects were given the 
opportunity to withdraw from the study 
without penalty. None did so. 
Results. Table 111 presents the 
est i ma t ed probab i 1 i t i es that 
were obtained for .2, .4, .6, and .8 for 
both the winning and losing contexts. 
The data labeled "restricted" represents, 
as discussed above, the average of two 
estimates that are based on the 
restriction that the estimates for 
complementary events sum to one. The 
data labeled "unrestricted" are based on 
the estimates found when the sums are not 
restricted to add to one. Regardless of 
which of these models is assumed, the 
estimates in the table indicate that 
indeed across individuals a strong 
biasing effect exists. The same 
objectively stated probability values 
( . 2 ,  .4, .6, and .8) when presented to 
individuals, elicit consistently 
different subjective values or weights in 
A t  all their decision making process. 
four estimated levels of probability, the 
estimates that were associated with 
winning outcomes were consistently 
weighted lower than the corresponding 
values for losing. This represents a 
very strong affective bias in the 
estimation and/or weighting processes for 
subjective likelihoods. 
subject, i ve 
Table I11 
Median Estimates of Winning and Losing 
Subjective Probabilities 
Restricted Case 
Actual Prob L Prob W Difference ____________________--------------------- 
. z o o  .347 .208 .139 
.400 .462 . 4 0 1  .061 
.600 .599 .539 .060 
.800 .793 .653 .040 ______________________-_----------------_ 
Unrestricted Case 
Actual Prob L Prob W Difference 
. z o o  .312 .238 .074 
.400 .469 .400 .069 
.600 .567 .508 .059 
.800 .815 .5 14 . 3 0 1  
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SUMMARY 
W h c ~ r i  an event  11;i:; an c a s  1 : * t i  1 i skied 
prohability c \ s s o c i o t e d  with i t ,  i t  should 
be irrrlevant whcsther that evcnt i s  
associated with :I "good" 01'  "hncl" out(.onre 
context; the affr.(:tive nature of t h e  
outcomes should not influence probability 
estimation o r  weighting in Lhe decision 
process. In this study, two probability 
functions wet-c e s t  imatod, and diffcrcnt 
values were found to be assigned to the 
winning and losing events. This 
differential weighting of t h e  same event 
suggests t h a t  there is an affective 
influence on probability estimation i n  
the decision making process. lndividuals 
make choices between alternatives by 
assigning d i f f e r e n t  subjective 
probabilities or weights to the same 
explicit event depending on whether i t  
has a positive affective component 
(winning) or a negative affective 
component (losing). 
The DSS methodology is important. 
because i t  has the potential of not only 
quantitatively measuring this probability 
bias b u t  also of explaining how some 
biases in probability estimation may 
cause suboptimal decisions, and how such 
bias can be reduced or eliminated in 
training decision makers to become more 
"expert" judges. It is designed to lead 
to programmatic research that has the 
ultimate application of developing 
training procedures that can: (a) 
standardize probability estimation 
methods in decision making under risk, 
(b) eliminate estimation biases such as 
over- and underestimation, (c) reduce 
individual differences in probability 
estimation, and (d) develop a scale for 
assessing a decision maker's accuracy and 
unbiasedness in subjective probability 
estimation. Research in this area is 
necessary if we are to go beyond merely 
describing suboptimal decision making 
behavior. The present study is an 
attempt to begin programmatic research 
that will allow us to predict suboptimal 
behavior due to biases in probability 
estimates and to train individuals to 
reduce bias in their judgments. In 
particular, several issues seems to be 
initially relevant to continued research. 
First, how strong and how generalizable 
is the differential weighting effect for 
probabilities? Second, what factors 
influence the strength of this effect? 
And, third, can a method like the DSS 
procedure coupled with the dual bilinear 
model allow us to predict and 
quantitatively measure the effects of 
suboptimal decision making strategies? 
The research reported here, together 
with that reported elsewhere [8, 9, 10, 
15, 161 is resulting in a more complete 
picture of the complex role that 
est i m a t .  ion b i a s  and nffect. play in 
decision- making under risk or 
uiicertziint y. Our findings suggest that 
the dual bilinear model is a model worth 
pursuing. I t  has the  potential to explain 
a number of difficult findings in the 
decision making 1 i terature including the 
framing effect [ 131, the differential 
weight ing c f f c c t  1 6 1 ,  and the "caut,ious 
optimists" effect [ 151.  Finally, the 
DSS procedure offers a quantitni i17e  
measurement procedure for act::.,: ly 
measuring rather that simp.ly describing 
biases i n  judgment and decision making 
processes. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This research was supported in part 
by Contract F33615-85--D-0514 from the U. 
S .  Air Force and Grant S-760--7MG-052 from 
the Air Force Office of Scientific 
Research, Bolling AFB, DC to the first 
author. 
REFERENCES 
1 .  
2 .  
3. 
4 .  
5 .  
6. 
7. 
Arkes, H. R., and Hammond, K. R., 
(Eds.), Judgment and d e c i s i o n  mak- 
i n g :  An i n  t e r d . i s c i p l i n a r y  r e a d e r ,  
(Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 1986). 
Bar-Hill, M., "The base rate fallacy 
i n A c t a  
P s y c h o l o g i c a ,  44. 1980, 211-233. 
Davidson, D., Suppes, P . ,  & Siegel, 
S .  , D e c i s i o n  making: An e x p e r i -  
menta l  approach,  (Stanford Univer- 
sity Press, Stanford, C A ,  1957). 
Edwards, W., "Conservatism in human 
information processing," in: B. 
Kleinmuntz (Ed. ) , Formal r e p r e s e n -  
t a t i o n  o f  human judgment ,  (Wiley, 
New York, 1968), 17-52. 
Einhorn, H. J . ,  & Hogarth, R. M., 
'I Be hav i or a1 decision theory: 
Processes of judgment and choice," 
Annual Review of P s y c h o l o g y ,  32, 
p rob ab i 1 i t y j u d gm e n t s , It 
1981, 53-88. 
Fischoff, B. "Perceived informative- 
ness of facts", Journal  o f  
Exper imenta l  P s y c h o l o g y  : Human 
P e r c e p t i o n  and Performance ,  3, 1977, 
349-358. 
Fischoff, B., & Slovic, P ,  "A little 
learning . . .  : Confidence in multi- 
cue judgment tasks,'' in: R. E .  
Nickerson (Ed.), A t t e n t i o n  and 
per formance  ( V o l .  8 ) ,  (Erlbaum, 
Hillsdale, NJ, 1980). pp. 779-800. 
242 ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUAS!TY 
ORIGINAL PAGE 1% 
OF POOR QfJALfW 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
Hogar Ih, n . ,  " H try o n c l  d I sc r e t e 
biases: Functional and tlysfunc- 
t ional tispec-ts of judgmental heuris- 
tics, " P s y c h o l o g i c a l  B u l  l e t i n ,  90, 
1981. 197 217. 
Isen,. A. M . ,  & Nygren T. E., "The 
influence of positive affect 011 the 
subjective utility of gains and 
losses: I t ' s  just not. worth the 
risk," Journal of P e r s o n a l i t y  and 
S o c i a l  P s y c h o l o g y ,  in press, 1988. 
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, 
A., (Bds. ) , Judgment under- uncer-  
t a i n t y :  H e u r i s t i c  and b i a s e s ,  
(Cambridge Universit,~ Press, N e w  
York, 1982). 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A., 
"Subjective probability: A judgment 
of Cogni t .i v e  represent at i ven e s s , " 
P s y c h o l o g y ,  3, 1972, 430-454. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A., "On the 
psychology of prediction, 'I Psycho-  
1og.icnl Rev iew ,  80, 1973, 237-251. 
Kahneman, D., 8, Tversky, A., 
"Prospect theory: An analysis o f  
decisions under risk, " Econometr ika ,  
47 ,  1979, 263-291. 
Luce, A. D. , & Narens, I . .  , 
"Classification of concatenation 
measurement: Structures according to 
scale type," Journal  of Mathe- 
m a t i c a l  Psycho. logy ,  29, 1986, 1-72. 
Nygren, T. E., & Isen, A. M . ,  
"Examining probability estimation: 
Evidence for dual subjective proba- 
bility functions," Paper presented 
at the Psychonomic Society Meetings, 
Boston, MA, November, 1985. 
N y g r e n ,  T. E., & Morera, 0 . .  
"Davidson, SuPPes 1 & Siege1 
revisited: Evidence for a dual 
bilinear model," Paper presented at 
the Mathematical Psychology Meeting, 
Evanston, IL, July, 1988. 
Slovic, P . ,  Fischoff, A . ,  & 
Lichtenstein, S., "Facts and fears: 
Understanding perceived risk," in: 
R .  Schwing & W. A. Albers, Jr. 
(Eds. ) , S o c i e t a l  r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t :  
How s a f e  i s  s a f e  enough? (Plenum 
Press, New York, 1980) Plenum., 181- 
216. 
Slovic, P., Fischoff, B., & 
Lichtenstein, S., "Response mode, 
framing, and information-processing 
effects in risk assessment," in: R. 
Hogarth (Ed. ) ,  N e w  d i r e c t i o n s  f o r  
me thodo logy  o f  s o c i a l  and b e h a v i o r a l  
s c i  en ce : N o .  1 1 ,  Q u e s t i o n  f raming  
and r e s p o n s e  c o n s i s t e n c y ,  (Jossey- 
Bass, San Francisco), 1982, 21-36. 
19. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, I ) . ,  
" Av a i 1 ob i 1 j. t y : A heuristic for 
judging frequency and probability," 
C o g n i t i v e  P s y c h o l o g y ,  5, 1973, 207- 
232. 
20. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D., "Judg- 
ment under uncertainty: Heuristics 
and biases, 'I Science,  185, 1974 , 
1124- 1131. 
21. Wickens, C. D., Stokes, A., Rarnett, 
B . ,  & Davis, T. "Componential 
analysis of pilot decision making," 
USAF Technical Report, June 1987. 
243 
